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SMALL AMOUNT CREDIT CONTRACTS AND PAYDAY LOANS  
The complementarity of price regulation and responsible lending regulation  
 
NICOLA J HOWELL 
 
In August 2014, the Federal Court of Australia delivered a significant decision on the 
scope and application of new responsible lending laws for credit providers: Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission v The Cash Store Pty Ltd (in liquidation) 
[2014] FCA 926 (‘ASIC v The Cash Store’). The court found that there were 
numerous breaches of the responsible lending obligations by The Cash Store 
(‘TCS’), a credit assistance provider (now in liquidation), and Assistive Finance 
Australia (‘AFA’), a credit provider, when providing small, short-term loans (often 
known as payday loans) to consumers.  
  
The decision gives some guidance about how the courts are likely to interpret the 
responsible lending obligations introduced in 2009, but it also has significance for the 
ongoing debate about how best to regulate small, short-term loans. This part of the 
consumer credit market has been subject to significant criticism, and in 2012, the 
national credit laws were amended to provide greater protection for consumers. One 
of the most controversial aspects of the 2012 amendments was the introduction of 
national price regulation, which capped the prices that could be charged for most 
loans. Opponents to this change argued at the time that, with the introduction of 
responsible lending laws in 2009, price regulation was no longer necessary. In light 
of the success of Australian Securities and Investments Commission (‘ASIC’) in ASIC 
v The Cash Store has this claim been borne out? 
 
This article focuses on The Cash Store litigation and outcome in the context of the 
recent regulatory changes impacting heavily on small loans (termed ‘small amount 
credit contracts’ in the legislation). Despite the outcome in this case, the decision 
does not establish that the responsible lending obligations alone are sufficient to 
protect vulnerable consumers from the risks of small, high cost loans. Further judicial 
guidance on the substance of the responsible lending obligations is needed before 
any such claim could be supported. This also highlights the importance of ASIC, the 
relevant regulator, being well-resourced; something that should be kept in mind by 
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the Australian Government as it implements its responses to the recommendations of 
recent reviews and inquiries: the Capability Review of ASIC,1 the Financial System 
Inquiry,2 and the Senate Economic References Committee’s inquiry into the 
performance of ASIC.3  
 
 
Regulation of small loans in Australia 
Small, short-term loans (often referred to as payday loans) first appeared in the 
Australian market in the late 1990s. These products, as offered by commercial 
providers, have long been criticised by consumer advocates and others as high 
priced products provided to people who are unable to obtain finance from 
mainstream lenders.4 This inability can be due to having a poor credit history and/or 
a low income, seeking to borrow only a small amount, and/or being excluded from 
mainstream institutions.5 Similar criticisms of this form of lending have been made in 
other jurisdictions with comparable consumer credit markets, including the United 
Kingdom and United States, and additional regulation has recently been 
implemented or is under consideration in these jurisdictions.6 Since these loans first 
emerged in Australia, there have been numerous changes to policy settings to 
combat the consumer risks of these small loans. Initially changes occurred in State 
and Territory legislation, and included interest-rate caps in some (but not all) 
jurisdictions, and amendments to close legislative loopholes that were taken 
advantage of by some lenders. However, following the transfer of responsibility for 
consumer credit regulation to the Australian Government in 2009, law reform efforts 
have been focused at the national level.  .  
                                                            
1  Australian Government, The ASIC Capability Review Panel ‘Fit for the Future: A capability review of the 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission (December 2015). 
2  Commonwealth of Australia, Financial System Inquiry Final Report (November 2014). 
3  Senate Economics References Committee, Performance of the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission (June 2014). 
4  For a discussion of concerns about high cost, small loans, see for example, Zac Gillam and Consumer Action 
Law Centre, ‘Payday Loans: Helping Hand or Quicksand’ (September 2010); Marcus Banks et al, 'Caught Short: 
Exploring the Role of Small, Short‐term Loans in the Lives of Australians', Social Policy Unit, The University of 
Queensland, (August 2012) 5‐9. 
5  For example, Marcus Banks et al, above n 4, 30‐31; Paul Ali, Cosima McRae and Ian Ramsay, 'The Politics of 
Payday Lending Regulation in Australia' (2013) 39 Monash University Law Review 411, 416‐17. 
6  See, for example, Financial Conduct Authority (UK), Detailed rules for the price cap on high‐cost short‐term 
credit (PS14/16, 2015); ‘Payday, Vehicle Title, and Centre High‐Cost Installment Loans; Proposed Rule’, 81 Fed 
Reg 141 (22 July 2016) (Federal Register: the Daily Journal of the United States). 
3 
 
 
The primary law covering consumer credit is now the National Consumer Credit 
Protection Act 2009 (Cth) (‘NCCPA’). This legislation introduced new licensing and 
responsible lending obligations applying to all consumer credit providers, including 
obligations on credit providers and credit assistance providers to: 
 
 Give a Credit Guide that contains information about the provider, including 
information about the provider’s internal and external dispute resolution 
processes; 
 Make reasonable inquiries about the prospective borrower’s requirements and 
objectives in relation to the credit contract, and their financial situation;  
 Take reasonable steps to verify the consumer’s financial situation;  
 Make an assessment about whether the credit contract will be unsuitable for 
the consumer; (the relevant assessment will be a preliminary assessment if 
carried out by a credit assistance provider); and 
 Not provide credit or credit assistance if the contract will be unsuitable for the 
consumer.7  
 
In 2012, the NCCPA was amended to introduce national price regulation for most 
consumer credit products.8 Although price regulation applies to loans of all sizes, it 
was the concern about small, relatively high cost loans that provided much of the 
impetus for the changes. As explained by the then responsible minister, the changes 
were introduced ‘to reduce the financial harm caused by lenders who ruthlessly 
impose excessive fees and charges simply because vulnerable consumers cannot 
obtain alternative access to credit’.9 The 2012 changes to the NCCPA also included 
additional responsible lending obligations applicable to the provision of small amount 
credit contracts.  
 
The introduction of national price regulation was hotly debated.10 Among other 
                                                            
7  For credit assistance providers, see NCCPA ss 113, 115‐118, 123‐124.; for credit providers, see NCCPA ss 126, 
128‐130, 133. 
8  National Credit Code (Sch 1 to the NCCPA) (‘NCC’), Part 2, Div 4, 4A.   
9  Bill Shorten (Minister for Financial Services and Superannuation), ‘Payday Borrowers Better Protected as Bill 
Passes Parliament’ (Media Release No 051, 20 August 2012).   
10  A description of the consultation process in the national context is in Ali et al, above n 5, 426‐438.   
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things, industry critics of price regulation argued that the new responsible lending 
obligations were sufficient to deal with any individual instances of overcommitment or 
irresponsible lending in relation to small loans, that there was no need for additional 
regulation of small loans, and that the proposed price ceiling for small loans would 
make lending unviable, and lead to an exodus of lenders.11 Critics also argued that 
not all borrowers were vulnerable, and removing small loans from the market would 
adversely affect those consumers for whom repayments would not cause hardship, 
particularly in light of the fact that mainstream lenders did not offer small amount 
loans.12 
 
ASIC v The Cash Store involved conduct that took place after the responsible lending 
laws were in force, but before national price regulation had been introduced. It may 
therefore provide some initial guidance on the impact of responsible lending on small 
loan lending practices, and the strength of any claim that price regulation is indeed 
unnecessary and amounts to over-regulation.  
 
 
The Cash Store decisions 
TCS was a licensed finance broker, arranging for consumers to borrow small 
amounts of money for short periods of time. TCS arranged loans only with AFA, a 
licensed credit provider. Although TCS and AFA were not related companies, they 
‘had a business arrangement under which AFA outsourced to TCS the full “servicing” 
of the loans that AFA funded’.13 
 
ASIC's case against TCS and AFA was based on its review of 281 contracts, a 
statistically relevant sample of the over 300 000 contracts that were arranged by TCS 
in a period of just over 2 years. The credit contracts were for amounts of up to $2200 
and for periods of between 1 and 36 days.14 They were described by the court as 
payday loans, and, if they had been entered into on or after 1 July 2013, most would 
have been categorised as either a ‘small amount credit contract’ or a ‘short-term 
                                                            
11  For example, National Financial Services Federation, Submission to Commonwealth Treasury, ‘National 
Consumer Credit Protection Amendment (Enhancements) Bill 2011, 5 September 2011, 15‐17; 21‐22. 
12  Ibid, 33‐34.   
13  ASIC v The Cash Store [2014] FCA 926, [5].   
14  Ibid [6]. 
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credit contract’.15  
 
The Federal Court reviewed each of the 281 contracts and related files, and found a 
total of 1109 contraventions of the responsible lending obligations to: 
 make reasonable inquiries about a consumer’s requirements and objectives 
and financial situation;16 
 take reasonable steps to verify a consumer’s financial situation; 
 make an assessment of whether the contract will be unsuitable for the 
consumer; and 
 provide a Credit Guide.17 
 
The court described the conduct of TCS as ‘a systemic failure … to comply with its 
obligations under Pt 3 of the Credit Act’18 and noted that the evidence in the matter 
demonstrated ‘gross and systemic failures … to comply with the legislative 
requirements’.19 Davies J also found that the breaches by TCS were also breaches 
by AFA as the credit provider: outsourcing its functions did not exonerate AFA from 
liability for non-compliance with AFA’s own obligations under the credit legislation.20  
 
In the subsequent penalty decision, Davies J noted that the contraventions were very 
serious, and that the ‘widespread and significant nature, extent and duration’ of the 
conduct called for the imposition of the maximum penalties.21 Her Honour imposed 
penalties of $10.725 million and $7.15 million against TCS and AFA respectively for 
contraventions of the responsible lending obligations, as well as a penalty of $1.1 
million on TCS for contravening the prohibition against unconscionable conduct.22 In 
                                                            
15  A ‘small amount credit contract’ (‘SACC’) is an unsecured loan, with a term of between 16 days and 1 year 
and a credit limit of $2,000 or less; a ‘short‐term credit contract’ (‘STCC’) is a contract with a term of less than 
16 days and a credit limit of $2,000 or less: NCCPA s5(1); NCC s 204(1).. 
16  The judgment refers to ‘customers’, however, the NCCPA obligations apply only to consumers, and so the 
term 'consumers' is used for consistency. 
17  ASIC v The Cash Store [2014] FCA 926 [66].   
18  Ibid [62]. 
19  Ibid [65].   
20  Ibid [68]. 
21  Australian Securities and Investments Commission v The Cash Store Pty Ltd (in liquidation) (No 2) [2015] FCA 
93 [10]. 
22  Ibid.   
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total, this was the largest civil penalty obtained by ASIC at the time,23 and appears to 
remain the largest penalty to date. Civil penalties are one of a number of 
administrative or enforcement responses that can be pursued where there is a 
contravention of the NCCPA,24 and ASIC’s decision to seek a civil penalty outcome 
(rather than some other option) reflects the seriousness with which this conduct was 
viewed by ASIC.25 It also highlights the role that civil penalties can play in both 
specific and general deterrence.26  
 
 
Are the responsible lending obligations enough to protect vulnerable 
consumers? 
As explained above, this case is noteworthy as one of the first judgments on the 
responsible lending provisions.27 As neither TCS nor AFA appeared at the hearing, it 
was not a contested hearing, and some commentary criticised the precedential value 
of the decision.28 However, the lack of appearance by TCS or AFA did not absolve 
ASIC from the burden of convincing the court that, on the balance of probabilities, 
TCS and ACA had contravened the relevant provisions.29  
 
Although the case was successful on the basis of the responsible lending laws, it is 
difficult to characterise it as a decision that demonstrates that responsible lending 
obligations are enough to protect borrowers of small loans. The case as run by ASIC, 
and the findings by the Federal Court, were focused on the more preliminary matters: 
 
 Was a Credit Guide provided?  
                                                            
23  Australian Securities and Investments Commission, ‘Federal Court Orders Record Penalty’ (Media Release, 
15‐032MR), 19 February 2015. 
24  Others include administration sanctions (eg, ss 54‐56 and Part 2‐4 NCCPA), infringement notices (s 331 
NCCPA), enforceable undertakings (s 322 NCCPA), injunctions (s177 NCCPA), compensation orders (s 178 
NCCPA), and adverse publicity orders (s 182 NCCPA).   
25  ASIC’s enforcement response is graduated, depending on, among other things, the seriousness of the 
conduct: Australian Securities and Investments Commission, ASIC’s Approach to Enforcement (Info 151, 
September 2013) 8‐9. This graduation of enforcement responses is consistent with the ‘enforcement pyramid’ 
discussed in Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate 
(Oxford University Press, 1992) 35‐36.   
26  See also Make it Mine Finance Pty Ltd; Re Make it Mine Finance Pty Ltd (No 2) [2015] FCA 1255 [112]‐[113].    
27  Another decision is AF&L First Mortgages Ltd v Suzann Owens [2014] VCC 1190.   
28  See Nathan Lynch, ‘Lawyers Question the Impact of ASIC’s Landmark Payday Lending Case’, Banking Day, 23 
February 2015, <http://www.bankingday.com/nl06_news_selected.php?selkey=18215>.   
29  See NCCPA ss 166(2), 167(2), 202; ASIC v Cash Store [2014] FCA 926 [76]-[77]. 
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 Were appropriate enquiries made about the borrowers' circumstances and 
financial position? 
 Were appropriate steps taken to verify the financial information collected?  
 
These are important parts of the responsible lending obligations, and the systemic 
failure to comply suggests that it may also have been difficult for TCS and AFA to 
demonstrate that their credit assessment and lending decisions were compliant with 
the NCCPA. However, ASIC v The Cash Store does not go directly to the question of 
whether the specific loans granted were ‘not unsuitable’ for the individual borrowers 
to whom they were granted, and therefore whether they should have entered into the 
credit contract.  
 
Under the NCCPA, one of the circumstances where a loan will not be considered 
suitable is where, at the time of the suitability assessment, it is likely that the 
consumer will be unable to comply with their obligations under the contract, or will be 
able to comply only with substantial hardship.30 The concept of substantial hardship 
is not defined in the NCCPA, and it may be that when a small loan is considered in 
isolation, courts may be reluctant to find that compliance with the terms of the 
contract will cause substantial hardship. This is one of the reasons that consumer 
advocates have suggested that the responsible lending obligations alone are 
insufficient to protect vulnerable consumers from the risks associated with payday 
loans.31 
 
The NCCPA does include a presumption that compliance with a contract will cause 
substantial hardship if, at the time of the assessment, the debtor is in default under 
another small amount credit contract, or if the debtor has had two or more other small 
amount credit contracts in the previous 90 days.32 However, this presumption can be 
rebutted by a credit business, and neither this presumption (and what would be 
                                                            
30  See NCCPA ss 118(2)(a) (for credit assistance providers), 131(2)(a) (for credit providers).   
31  Gillam and Consumer Action Law Centre, above n 4, 18. 
32  NCCPA ss 118(3A), 131(3A). Although the Interim Report of the Review of the Small Amount Credit Contract 
Laws proposed replacing the presumption with a ban on providing SACCs to consumers with two or more 
SACCs in the previous 90 days, the Final Report has recommended that the presumption be removed, and 
instead a broader protected earnings amount be implemented: See The Australian Government the Treasury, 
‘Review of the Small Amount Credit Contract Laws: Interim Report’ (December 2015) 13; The Australian 
Government the Treasury, ‘Review of the Small Amount Credit Contract Laws: Final Report’ (March 2016) 22. 
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needed to rebut it), nor the general concept of substantial hardship and suitability in 
the context of small, short-term loans, were tested or explored in ASIC v The Cash 
Store. Thus, it is not possible to state definitively what the outcome would have been 
if TCS and AFA had complied with the preliminary steps discussed above, and then 
provided assistance with or entered into the same contracts with the same borrowers. 
Without a better understanding of how the courts will approach the issue of 
substantial hardship in the context of small amount loans, the extent to which the 
responsible lending obligations sufficiently protect borrowers of small loans cannot be 
known. Such guidance can only be provided by a future judgment about the scope of 
the substantial hardship concept in the small loan context.33 
 
This points to a further difficulty associated with relying solely on responsible lending 
obligations to protect vulnerable consumers from the risks associated with small, 
short-term loans. Although there is scope for ASIC to take action on behalf of 
affected consumers, as it did in ASIC v The Cash Store, in most cases, a consumer 
seeking to challenge a lending decision will need to either commence legal 
proceedings or lodge a dispute with the relevant external dispute resolution scheme. 
However, qualitative research with borrowers of community loans and payday loans 
in Melbourne found that they had little understanding of their consumer rights and 
remedies, and a low propensity to take action to query unfair terms.34 Similarly, it 
might be expected that borrowers of small amount loans, who are often on low 
incomes,35 may be less likely to challenge lending decisions than other borrowers. 
Further, an assessment of suitability is necessarily an individual one, so that a finding 
that one particular loan is unsuitable for one particular consumer may not necessarily 
have wider application. 
 
It is here that price regulation, such as that introduced in the 2012 amendments to 
the NCCPA, has an advantage. Unlike responsible lending, price regulation does not 
                                                            
33  In another case, the parties agreed that various responsible lending provisions had been contravened: Make 
it Mine Finance Pty Ltd, in the matter of Make it Mine Finance Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 393 [64]. 
34  Therese Wilson, Nicola Howell and Genevieve Sheehan, 'Protecting the Most Vulnerable in Consumer Credit 
Transactions' (2009) 32(2) Journal of Consumer Policy 117, 133, 135. 
35  A recent report found that over a quarter of payday borrowers earned less than $30,000: Digital Finance 
Analytics and Monash University Centre for Commercial Law and Regulatory Studies, The Stressed Finance 
Landscape Data Analysis (October 2015), 23 <http://www.digitalfinanceanalytics.com/reports.html>. See also 
Banks et al, above n 4, 15‐16.   
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consider the circumstances of individual borrowers. Instead, unfairness or 
exploitation can be addressed in a much more systemic way. A similar regulatory 
approach can be seen in the prohibition of unfair terms in consumer contracts, where 
the courts can declare a particular term in a contract void, with adverse 
consequences for a supplier who subsequently uses or relies on such a term in other 
contracts.36  
 
Thus, even if concerns about the effectiveness of responsible lending obligations in 
the context of small, short-term loans do not come to fruition, it is critical to have a 
regulatory system that can provide a systemic response to unfair or unsafe pricing 
where the relevant market is characterised by disadvantaged or vulnerable 
consumers. 
 
 
Clarifying the high level standards in the responsible lending obligations 
The responsible lending obligations in the NCCPA contain a number of what might be 
described as high-level, principles-based, or ‘open-textured’ standards. For example, 
the obligations to make inquiries and take steps to verify information are qualified by 
the reference to what is ‘reasonable’. And the assessment of suitability focuses on 
the concept of ‘substantial hardship’. These types of standards are perhaps 
necessary, given the wide range of credit contracts, and individuals, to whom the 
legislation will apply, and the consequent need for flexible approaches to credit 
assessment. They are also consistent with other consumer protection laws, which 
proscribe broadly described concepts such as ‘unconscionable’ conduct,37 ‘unfair’ 
terms,38 and ‘unjust’ transactions.39   
 
However, industry also needs some guidance on the scope of such concepts. 
Traditionally, this development and exposition of high legal or broad legal obligations 
occurs through judicial consideration. For example, in the case of more long-standing 
                                                            
36  For financial services contracts, see Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) (‘ASIC 
Act’), ss 12GND, 12GNB(1). For the forthcoming changes for small business contracts, see Treasury Legislation 
Amendment (Small Business and Unfair Contract Terms) Act 2015 (Cth).   
37  ASIC Act, ss 20‐22. 
38  ASIC Act, s 12BF. 
39  NCCPA, s 76.   
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prohibitions, such as the prohibitions against unconscionable conduct and unjust 
transactions, there is considerable case law to provide guidance for industry and 
consumers.40 However, in the case of the more recent responsible lending 
obligations, ASIC v The Cash Store is one of the few decisions in which these broad 
standards have been subject to some judicial analysis.  
 
How did the Federal Court approach these broad standards? In ASIC v The Cash 
Store, Davies J took the view that the ‘reasonable’ inquiries and ‘reasonable’ steps to 
verify were the inquiries and steps that would be sufficient to enable an informed 
assessment as to whether: 
 
 the credit contract would meet the consumer’s requirements and objectives, 
and  
 the consumer would be able to comply with the contract without substantial 
hardship.41  
 
The reference in the judgment to an informed assessment suggests that perfunctory 
inquiries of the consumer are likely to be insufficient. Similarly, it suggests that a 
credit participant would need to make further inquiries if a consumer provided 
inconsistent or contradictory information about their financial circumstances or 
requirements and objectives. However, as acknowledged by Davies J, it will not also 
be possible to identify in isolation of a particular transaction all of the inquiries and 
verification steps that will be reasonable. Instead, her Honour identified some 
minimum requirements for compliance (at least for the contracts under 
consideration).  
 
In relation to the obligation to make reasonable inquiries about the consumer’s 
requirements and objectives, ASIC took the view that this required that the stated 
purpose of the loan be specific enough to be able to ‘reasonably ascertain what the 
money was needed for’. So a stated purpose of ‘bills’ was reasonable if the amount 
                                                            
40  Although the case law is not always consistent – see the discussion in Jeannie Paterson and Gerard Brody 
(2015) ‘"Safety Net" Consumer Protection: Using Prohibitions on Unfair and Unconscionable Conduct to 
Respond to Predatory Business Models’, 38(3) Journal of Consumer Policy 331, 341‐3. 
41  ASIC v The Cash Store [2014] FCA 926 [28].   
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was reasonable ($500 or less), but more general expressions of the purpose of the 
loan, such as ‘living expenses’ or ‘personal’, were insufficient to demonstrate 
compliance.42 In her analysis, Davies J took a similar approach, although her Honour 
disagreed with ASIC’s conclusion in four instances.43  
 
According to Davies J, compliance with the obligation to make reasonable inquiries 
about the consumer’s financial situation requires, as a minimum, inquiries about the 
consumer’s current income and living expenses,44 and this is likely to include 
consideration of at least each of rent/mortgage, groceries, utilities, other expenses 
and other debt.45 Further, reasonable verification of the consumer’s financial 
situation requires at least verification of income and housing payments.46  
 
These views on the required minimum standards are unsurprising. Because these 
standards were rarely met in the files reviewed for this case, there was no need for 
Davies J to go further to determine whether other inquiries or verification steps would 
also be required, or to consider whether the particular loans granted were suitable.  
 
In the context of broad high level standards in the responsible lending obligations, 
and the limited (to date) exposition of the scope and application of the requirements 
through litigation, ASIC’s regulatory guides play a crucial role for industry and 
consumers. ASIC’s Regulatory Guide 209 Credit Licensing: Responsible Lending 
Conduct (‘RG209’) is a very detailed document, with over 40 pages of what is 
described as indicative guidance for industry. ASIC’s regulatory guides are not 
approved by the Parliament or courts, they are not binding and do not amount to 
legal advice.47 However, these regulatory guides are often very influential. One 
commentator has referred to ASIC’s regulatory guides as taking on a ‘quasi legal 
character’,48 and ASIC itself explains that RG209 sets out the conduct that it expects 
                                                            
42  Ibid [34]. 
43  Ibid [35‐38]. 
44  Ibid [43]. 
45  Ibid [52]. 
46  Ibid [47]. 
47  Australian Securities and Investments Commission, RG209 Credit Licensing: Responsible Lending Conduct (15 
November 2014).   
48  Gail Pearson, Financial Services Law and Compliance in Australia (Cambridge University Press, 2009) 153. 
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of industry members.49 Further, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal has given some 
weight to ASIC Regulatory Guides,50 and, as noted above, Davies J’s approach to 
the responsible lending obligations largely confirmed ASIC’s guidance. Non-
compliance with regulatory guidance on responsible lending is therefore likely to be a 
risky path for industry to follow.  
 
ASIC’s activities as the regulator in the small loans sector 
Since being given responsibility for consumer credit regulation in 2010, ASIC has 
taken a range of other enforcement and review action against other commercial 
providers of small amount loans. For example, in March 2016, Nimble agreed to 
provide refunds of more than $1.5 million to over 7,000 consumers after an ASIC 
investigation that found significant deficiencies in Nimble’s compliance with the 
responsible lending laws.51 ASIC has also conducted two reviews of the small loan 
sector, with the results suggesting that levels of compliance with the new laws by 
small loans providers need to be improved.52 
 
Most of the enforcement matters initiated by ASIC have been settled or dealt with 
administratively. As a result, they provide little direct guidance on the application of 
either the responsible lending laws or the price regulation laws in the context of small 
amount lending. Similarly, there has been little private litigation that has resulted in a 
judicial statement on the scope or application of the responsible lending laws. This 
low level of private litigation is not unexpected, given the availability of the industry 
External Dispute Resolution Schemes (such as the Financial Ombudsman Service), 
which can be used without charge by consumers and small businesses.  
 
However, ASIC’s performance as the financial services regulator has been heavily 
criticised in recent years, and reports by the Senate Economics Reference 
Committee and the Financial System Inquiry made numerous recommendations to 
                                                            
49  Australian Securities and Investments Commission, RG209, above n 47, 10. 
50  See, for example, Vissenjous v ASIC [2015] AATA 98 [13]‐[14]; Coshett v ASIC [2014] AATA 677 [16]. 
51  Australian Securities and Investments Commission, ‘Payday lender Nimble to refund $1.5 million following 
ASIC probe’ (Media Release, 16‐089MR, 23 March 2016). 
52  Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Payday Lenders and the New Small Amount Lending 
Provisions (REP426, March 2015); Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Review of Micro Lenders’ 
Responsible Lending Conduct and Disclosure Obligations (REP264, November 2011).   
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improve the capability and effectiveness of ASIC, including recommendations for 
improved funding arrangements and stronger regulatory tools.53  
 
The government accepted many of these recommendations. It also commissioned a 
capability review of ASIC, the report of which was released in April 2016.54 Among 
other things, this review was critical of ASIC’s enforcement approach and 
recommended that ASIC ‘develop a targeted approach to litigation, pushing risk 
appetite to pursue cases that are strategically important, particularly in testing the 
veracity of the law pursuing conduct.’55 This confirms that the regulator should play a 
critical role in litigating matters to obtain judicial guidance on the scope and 
application of high level standards in consumer credit legislation. Unless ASIC has 
sufficient regulatory capacity, important cases, like ASIC v The Cash Store, will be 
few and far between. 
 
Conclusion  
The litigation against TCS and AFA resulted in two significant decisions, with the 
decision on the substantive law being one of the few decisions on the new 
responsible lending obligations, and the penalty decision resulting in the highest civil 
penalty obtained by ASIC to date. As the decisions focus on the small loan sector, 
they can provide some insight into the adequacy or otherwise of recent changes in 
the legislation that were designed to protect vulnerable or disadvantaged consumers. 
 
Although ASIC was successful in proving that TCS and AFA had contravened the 
responsible lending provisions, the outcome of this litigation does not establish that 
responsible lending obligations are sufficient to protect vulnerable or disadvantaged 
consumers. However, it does suggest that it is optimistic to assume that disclosure 
and creditor self-interest alone will always engender appropriate lending decisions. In 
the absence of responsible lending obligations in the NCCPA, the failure of TCS and 
ACA to make even the most perfunctory enquiries of a prospective borrower would 
have been difficult to challenge successfully. The size of the penalty imposed also 
                                                            
53  Commonwealth of Australia, above n 2, recommendations 27‐29; Senate Economics References Committee, 
above n 3, recommendations 9, 22, 41, 47, 48, 50, 57, 58. 
54  Australian Government, The ASIC Capability Review Panel ‘Fit for the Future: A capability review of the 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission (December 2015).   
55  Ibid 120. 
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reflects the seriousness with which the courts and others view conduct that adversely 
affects vulnerable or disadvantaged consumers.  
 
Traditionally, the regulation of consumer credit has emphasised the role of disclosure 
in providing consumer protection, and there was limited intervention in the market to 
regulate product suitability or product features. However, in more recent times, this 
emphasis has changed. The NCCPA retains a major role for disclosure; however, it is 
significantly more interventionist than the predecessor legislation. In particular, the 
introduction of responsible lending obligations and nationally uniform price regulation 
recognises that there are limits to the protection that can be provided through 
disclosure, especially where vulnerable or disadvantaged consumers are concerned.  
 
The specific provisions for small amount loans have recently been reviewed. The 
Interim Report, released in December 2015, observed that ‘the responsible lending 
obligations do not appear to be sufficient to prevent financial harm to consumers who 
use SACCs’,56 and the Final Report recommends maintaining the current price cap, 
as well as imposing some additional restrictions on lending decisions and loan 
costs57 Clearly the review was not persuaded by arguments that the outcome in 
ASIC v The Cash Store negates the need for price regulation.  
 
Price regulation and responsible lending are complementary, rather than alternative 
forms of regulation.  The introduction of these more interventionist forms of 
regulation reflects, in part, a concern for vulnerable consumers and an increased 
comfort with a product safety and product suitability approach to consumer credit 
regulation in Australia. ASIC plays a key role in administering these laws, with the 
aim of promoting ‘the confident and informed participation of … consumers in the 
financial system’.58 However, for consumers to fully obtain the benefit of these 
provisions, ASIC must have sufficient capacity and regulatory culture to act on 
allegations of misconduct, and to use litigation to deter poor behaviour, compensate 
consumers, and obtain detailed guidance on the scope and application of the high 
                                                            
56  The Australian Government the Treasury (Interim Report), above n 321, 7. 
57  The Australian Government the Treasury (Final Report), above n 32, 11 (recommendation 1), 24 
(recommendation 4), 31 (recommendation 7). 
58  See ASIC Act s 1(2)(a).   
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level standards in the consumer credit legislation. Implementing recommendations to 
increase the amount, certainty and stability of ASIC’s funding, and to improve ASIC’s 
regulatory culture, should therefore be a high priority for the Australian Government.  
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